The goal of this Article is to illuminate differences in how adjudication and mediation, taken on their own terms and norms, carve up the world. To that end, it assumes excellent mediation processes (and thus excellent mediators), 16 excellent adjudication processes (and thus excellent judges), and clients with adequate resources to pay for effective legal representation. 17 
II. MECHANISMS FOR MEANING
There is little debate these days that "facts" are not "out there" to be discovered. A basic premise of many of the social sciences is that, as a matter of cognition, the brain must "screen" the meaningful from the not meaningful. This basic insight has spawned intense scrutiny on "meaning-making" in "anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, literary theory, psychology, and, it would seem, wherever one looks these days." 18 This includes the role "categories" play in cognition.
19
Such an inquiry is sometimes characterized as the "cognitive revolution," the crux of which is the human need to "go beyond the information given." 20 Social psychologists have been particularly active in exploring meaningmaking. The groundbreaking work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman elaborated on how "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations." 21 A sampling of these heuristics: people tend "to overestimate the normativity and accuracy of their own beliefs"; "manage knowledge in a variety of ways to promote the selective availability of information . . . already arrived at"; and "interpret facts consistent with those we already 15 . Critiques of "bad adjudication" are legion, although perhaps the most powerful relate to courts of "mass justice" where litigants, virtually all pro se, receive minimal due process and no more than several minutes before a judicial officer. Barbara 17. This last assumption is an exceptionally important issue and one I have explored in detail in Rubinson, supra note 15.
18. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 2 (1990 A corollary to how humans inevitably simplify meaning is that such simplifications are as much about things that are not seen as about things that are seen. Sherlock Holmes famously noticed that a dog did not bark in the night. 23 We almost always notice a dog barking, which, necessarily, means that we do not notice a dog not barking. 24 "Noticing" (or including) only has meaning when what is noticed stands out from the vast expanse of what is not noticed (or excluded). This explains why the King's map is useless: by not excluding anything, it, by extension, includes nothing as well.
Moreover, "interpretation" is driven by preexisting goals, processes or methodologies that, by their nature, only examine what is necessary for the methodology to work. For example, in a book ranging over architecture, agriculture, forestry, resettlement in Tanzania, and the Russian Revolution, James C. Scott traces how efforts to impose order in the teeth of interlocking complexity fail because they inevitably create a world only "legible" in light of its simplifications, thereby "systematically . . . nudg [ing] reality toward the grid of its observations." 25 Another interdisciplinary work, by Judea Pearl, ranging over psychology, sociology, and computer science, defines "model" as "an idealized representation of reality that highlights some aspects and ignores others. 24. Given context, unlike Holmes' barking dog, we might even see nothing when there is something. An example comes from astronomy. "Black patches and lanes" in the Milky Way were long interpreted as empty spots or holes through which to see the "blackness of space." TIMOTHY FERRIS, SEEING IN THE DARK 229 (2002) . This "emptiness," however, was later determined to be "writhing, tumbling clouds" of dust-a neat example of how what appears to be "nothing" is "something"-a perfectly logical explanation that was overlooked (literally) for centuries. What matters is defined as "facts." What does not matter is "irrelevant," or, much more likely, not even visible. This section will explore how the theory and practice of adjudication goes about this crucial business of finding "the facts of a case."
A. Adjudication Drives Meaning
So what are "facts"? How does adjudication select which "facts" to consider? Anthropologist Clifford Geertz's offers this description of the process: "The rendering of fact so that lawyers can plead it, judges can hear it, and juries can settle it is just that, a rendering: . . . [it] propounds the world in which its descriptions make sense."
30 Consider another anthropologist, Sally Engle Merry: "Law provides a set of categories and frameworks through which the world is interpreted."
31
The basic idea here is that law creates a world by "reduc[ing] the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality beneath it to something more closely resembling the administrative grid of its observations." 32 These are "a series of typifications that are always some distance from the full reality these abstractions are meant to capture." 33 In doing so, adjudication screens the relevant from the irrelevant in order to render the world intelligible for its purposes. 34 Put another way, "facts" in adjudication are "interested, utilitarian facts," 35 
B. Rules Define Facts
In the language of adjudication, rules are powerful things. Legal discourse reifies the power of law through metaphor. Acts against law are acts of aggression, even violence: 37 a person "breaks" the law, "violates" the law, "evades" the law, "defies" the law. 38 Even the most common phrase of all-"against the law"-suggests forceful (itself a metaphor) opposition. These formulations embody a binary universe: you either adhere to rules or you do not. There is no middle ground in adjudication.
To gain this level of certainty, "facts" themselves must be certain. 39 In the vast majority of cases, the adversary system reduces the act of "finding facts" to two 42 This on/off quality is crucial to the methodology of law.
C. Just the Facts, Ma'am: The Role of Facts in Legal Discourse
Although both facts and law, as defined by adjudication, must be determinate, "facts" are peripheral in general academic discourse about law. Rules are the main event. While legal realism and its more recent variants focus on "facts," these are usually "social facts" which are not "facts" in individual circumstances. In contrast, and perhaps ironically, adjudication "on the ground" presents a much fuller and more subtle portrayal of the methodology of law in action in terms of the interplay of facts and law, although conventions of the fact/law distinction remain 36 In this section, I offer a tour of the world of "facts" in the theory and practice of adjudication. This is necessarily a radical summary that, in a few pages, ranges over untold books and articles. The vast majority of these works, however, do not focus on "facts" as I have described them; my purpose then is to identify what this discourse does not address.
Facts in Jurisprudential Debates
I begin with the fascinating debate originating in the early twentieth-century about the methodology of law-a debate that continues to this day.
a. Facts in Legal Formalism
The status of facts in legal formalism can best be described as having, for all intents and purposes, no status at all.
Roberto Unger offers a representative formulation of legal formalism: Formalism is a "belief in the availability of a deductive or quasi-deductive method capable of giving determinate solutions to particular problems of legal choice." 43 Lynn M. LoPucki offers another formulation: Formalism is the application of "the law laid down by legislatures and appellate courts to the facts of cases." 44 These and other basic articulations of legal formalism, and there are many, tend to be exclusively concerned with the interpretation of "rules." In a sense, formalism is a "giant syllogism machine, with a determinate, externally-mandated legal rule supplying the major premise, and objectively 'true' pre-existing facts providing the minor premise." 45 Given that "there really is one true rule of law, universal and unchanging, always and everywhere the same," 46 the subject of real inquiry is to state the "one true rule," with facts at best a superficial, intellectually undemanding inquiry applied to the rule. Moreover, the facts and law must be separate entities with one not influencing the other or with, as one commentator has put it, law and fact not "contaminating one another." 47 In virtually all instances, then, formalist methodology strives to identify a "determinate, externally mandated legal rule" as all rules must be. 48 In the end, a 48. I mean a number of things when I refer to "rules" in adjudication. Most obviously, this would include prescriptive language adopted by legitimate rule-making bodies, whether the framers of the striking aspect of how legal formalists view facts is that facts are really not viewed at all. They are simply "out there" to be found by anybody, and not needing the skills of legal analysis or, indeed, little if any intellectual scrutiny at all. 49 
b. Facts in Legal Realism
The critique of legal realism has a fascinating take on "facts." The realist critique, arising roughly from 1920-1940, picked apart the "scientific," deductive vision at the heart of formalism.
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In joining the debate with the syllogistic mechanics of legal formalism, a "central lesson" of legal realism is that "there will often be a range of credible interpretations of the meaning of a given legal rule." 51 The deeper critique is what drives a given "credible interpretation," and here is where the "politics of law" 52 comes into play. In this regard, legal realists conceived of law as constructed in light of a specific social "context." 53 Here is one elaboration of what this means:
[T]he "rule" of a former case can never simply be applied to a new case; rather, the judge must choose whether or not the ruling in the former case should be extended to include the new case. That choice is essentially a choice about the relevancy of facts, and those choices can never be logically compelled. Given shared social assumptions, some facts might seem obviously irrelevant (e.g., the color of socks worn by the offeree should not influence the enforceability of a contract), but decisions about the relevance of other distinguishing facts are more obviously value-laden and dependent on the historical context (e.g., the relative wealth of the parties). Such a critique that "facts," "relevance," and "context" are crucial to decisionmaking and the development of law unleashed a frontal attack on the "determinate" view of "facts" so central to the formalist methodology. 55 However, realists virtually always referred to "facts" in terms of the social context or "social facts." 56 Hence, the "relative wealth of the parties" is a "fact" crucial to just decisionmaking. This sense of "messy social particularity" 57 is, at this level, the heart of the realist critique. It requires "a close, contextual examination of social realityto facts, rather than the nonexistent spheres of classicism" 58 that were, in Felix Cohen's famous phrase, "transcendental nonsense." 59 The key for purposes of this Article, however, is that the realists' "particularities" are social particularities. There is no sense of individual 419-20 (1908) . An evocative example of the importance Brandeis ascribed to "social facts" is when he told Oliver Wendell Holmes that Holmes' "summer occupations" should include the "study of some domain of facts," such as "the textile industries of Massachusetts." 2 HOLMES-POLLACK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 13-14 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1961). Holmes noted that doing so "would be good for my immortal soul" and "good also for the performance of my duties," yet "I shrink from the bore." Id.
57. Mensch, supra note 53, at 34. 58. Id. at 35. Consider how social context is crucial to the origin of legal realism, particularly in the form of the Supreme Court's aversion towards progressive legislation in the early twentieth-century to the New Deal. A classic instance is Coppage v. Kansas, in which the Court invalidated legislation outlawing "yellow dog contracts"-contracts forbidding workers from engaging in union activitiesbecause economic inequality was not a recognized common law basis to render contracts unenforceable. 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915). Although evidently true as a matter of common law doctrine, the Court's obliviousness to social inequality invalidated progressive social reforms. Then, beginning with the appointment of Hugo Black 1937 by Franklin Roosevelt, the Supreme Court for some forty years declined to find constitutional fault with redistributive social legislation. particularities as furnishing the core of appropriate or realistic judicial decision making. This is an important distinction. While, to be sure, social particularities might be a component (or, some would argue, must be a component) of individual particularities, there is no sense that decision making should happen at an individual level. This aspect of realism is wholly consistent with the political and social context in which it arose, which was at a time when courts were invalidating progressive legislation through (realists argued) the veneer of formalist methodology. 60 However, while agreeing on little else, formalists and realists share one premise: decision making should be done by judges. The question thus was (and still largely is) not whether judges should make decisions, but how judges should make decisions.
Modern Critical Legal Theory
The critical theory movement is less focused than the realist critique, but most observers see the realists as their predecessors. Like realism, this critique, which arose out of the cultural upheavals of the 1960s, tends to pick apart doctrine as arising from social context. The critical legal theory movement (to the extent it is unified-a debatable point) often breaks down into the social categories upon which individual scholars focus. [t] o everyone acquainted at first hand with actual industrial conditions," and went on to ask: "Why, then do courts persist in the fallacy? Why do so many of them force upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the face of practical conditions of inequality?" Id. Of course, given a movement as broad and, at times, divergent, as legal realism, there are instances in the realist literature where "specific facts" in addition to "social facts" are viewed as crucial to decision making. Nevertheless, despite the multiplicity of approaches under the critical theory banner, their treatment of "facts" recalls the realists' focus on "social facts." For example, an important strand in critical theory is that social context is crucial to decision-making or, put another way, group experience as modulated through "cultural meaning," not merely individual "facts," should be crucial to decision making. 66 Given this perspective, the critical theory movement explores specific social contexts, such as how the law treats traditionally marginalized groups. In a way, then, the critical legal theory movement continues the realist idea of social context. 67 Critical legal theorists thus dig down into how specific social contexts, with all their intertwining social, legal, and political histories, inform the development of law.
68
Some modern critical theorists go further and argue that there is no good way to reach decisions, that there are no external principles-social or otherwise-that can generate traction to lead to just results. 69 Even this critique, however, remains wedded to the norms of adjudication in two ways. First, the focus is again the indeterminacy of rules, not facts. Second, the focus is on the indeterminacy of decision-making, not on who the decision maker can or should be and whether a change in this regard is worthwhile or even meaningful.
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There are many other examples of the complexity and variety of the critical theory movement, but in virtually all of these permutations facts in the sense of framing individual experience as conceptualizing conflicts are rarely, if ever, to be found. This remains true even among current successors of both the legal realists and critical legal theory scholars, such as the "New Legal Realists" 71 (1954) . One way of analyzing Brown is as legal realism in action: framing de jure segregation as "separate but equal" masks the reality (or context) that, in Brown's famous analysis, African-American children are branded as inferior with consequent damage to "their educational and mental development." Id. at 494-95. The subsequent development of law, from desegregation cases through affirmative action cases, is the triumph of "neutral" principle-"the Constitution is colorblind"-over how the country is not, with the result that the broader social context crucial to Brown has been replaced by an emphasis on particular showings of harm which are notoriously difficult to prove. For an analysis of this trend in the context of anti-discrimination law, (1989) . Fish argues that once "you start down the anti-formalist road, there is no place to stop"-all "is variable and contingent." Id. at 2.
70. As to its lack of meaning, Stanley Fish argues that even taking the anti-formalist critique to its logical extreme, there still must be an assumption that there exists something "independent of anyone's belief," yet who that someone or something is remains unidentified. 
D. Facts "On the Ground" in Adjudication: Lawyers, Judges, and Juries
Discussions about adjudication and the development of law in academic discourse are telling even in the context of the nuts and bolts of how matters are adjudicated. Understanding this "practical" realm involves exploring the skills of the advocate, the operation of procedural rules in adjudication that constrain the finding of facts, and who, in the end, decides "truth" in adjudication.
Advocacy
There is a formalist bent to advocacy in adjudication: there is truth and falsity in facts and law. There is also, simultaneously, an anti-formalist bent in advocacy: "fact investigation" and legal interpretation can be subject to multiple stories. Consider the role of "facts" at trial as described by Thomas Mauet: factual fluidity, the potential for construction of facts, a simplified map that offers a compelling story to finders of fact.
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It is also commonplace for advocates and, albeit rarely, scholars, 77 to note that the bulk of the day-to-day work of an advocate is "fact investigation," not legal research. Mauet puts it like this: "Most cases are decided by facts, not law . . . .
[L]itigators spend much of their time identifying and acquiring admissible evidence . . . that refutes the other side's contentions." 78 This vision of advocacy "on the ground" demonstrates an important tension in the rhetoric of law and the practice of law. While skilled advocates are well aware of the importance of presenting a "true" version of "what happened," advocates are also well aware that "what happened" is to be constructed. Skillful advocates construct a story that, to a fact-finder, is easy to grasp and must be what happened. 79 Powerful stories in advocacy appear not to be constructed, which in turn, is the source of their power. Clifford Geertz makes this point: If "'factconfigurations' are not merely things found lying about in the world and carried bodily into court, show-and-tell style, but close-edited diagrams of reality the matching process itself produces, the whole thing looks a bit like sleight-ofhand."
80 "Sleight-of-hand" that is easy to spot is bad advocacy just as it is bad magic.
Thus ] litigator's theory of the case is a detailed summary of the factual propositions . . . with the facts organized in such a way that they invoke the application of the . . . substantive rules of law . . . ."). It should hardly be news that more effective advocates-often the most highly paid advocates hired by the more highly resourced litigants-do a more effective job selecting facts in light of applicable legal rules. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Foreward, O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1996) ("Money can have a greater impact on the verdict than the 'facts' because it dictates how those 'facts' are transformed into legally admissible and persuasive evidence."). This point reaches its most intense manifestation in the huge number of civil stories are possible, and recognizing and assessing the most effective story is part of lawyering and, ultimately, how the process of fact-finding in adjudication works. 85 
Procedure as Exclusion
Another dimension of "facts" in adjudication is how often the goal of procedure is to exclude them. The most obvious example is the Rules of Evidence. At its most general level, these rules are determining which facts matter in ascertaining "the truth."
86 While usually framed in terms of "admissibility," it is just as accurate to approach them from the opposite side, that is, as rules of "inadmissibility." Inadmissibility may be based on "relevance," the crux of which is how helpful evidence is in establishing "the existence of any fact that is of consequence" to the litigation. 87 The intricate rules of hearsay also exclude evidence that, as determined by the long history of the hearsay rules, is of questionable trustworthiness.
88
Other related procedural mechanisms operate the same way. Pretrial motions-usually called motions in limine-determine whether evidence will or will not be admitted at trial. 89 The touchstone of permissible discovery is whether it "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
90
A judge deems a trial unnecessary by granting a motion for summary judgment because "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." REV. 1987 REV. (1999 . The crucial point for this Article, however, is not how appalling this state of affairs is (and it assuredly is), but that it is appalling because a primary (if not the primary) difference between skilled, highly resourced attorneys and less skilled, less well resourced attorneys (or unrepresented litigants) is their ability to find and shape facts in light of substantive and evidentiary legal rules at play.
85. Even the Supreme Court has, on occasion, recognized the importance of vivid storytelling in advocacy. Successful advocacy involves "tell[ing] a colorful story with descriptive richness . . . . Evidence thus has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning . . . . This persuasive power of the concrete and particular is often essential . . . . A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it." Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187-89 (1997). Note, however, that while recognizing the power of narrative, the Court does not embrace anti-formalism as far as facts are concerned. In other words, the "colorful story with descriptive richness" would be the right story, not the most effective story.
86. The Federal Rules of Evidence hold that the Rules "shall be construed" so "that the truth may be ascertained." FED. R. EVID. 102 
The Players: Who Finds Facts?
A final brief and obvious point about adjudication: finders of fact in adjudication are judges and juries. These are the actors in the litigation process who reach conclusions about "what happened." In contrast, attorneys are not decision makers, but rather the storytellers who present alternative versions of "what happened" so that decision makers can choose one or the other.
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This is a crucial point in terms of this Article, and one to which I will return at several points in what follows. 94 
IV. WHAT BRINGS US HERE TODAY: "FACTS" IN MEDIATION
Mediation employs an entirely different means of resolving disputes, but my focus here is not a general overview of these differences-a task that has been performed elsewhere. 
A. An Introduction: The Mediator in Mediation
Consider the rituals of adjudication: attendees in a courtroom stand as a judge enters; a clerk "calls the case"; the judge asks attorneys to "state your appearance for the record"; deference is shown (or should be shown) to judges while being addressed as "your honor"; witnesses are sworn. These are more than formalities: they are a sequence of events that reflects a deep-seated expectation. 99 -an invitation to say whatever a participant wants to say. This "wanting to say" is, more often than not, relating 93 . This is not all to minimize the role of attorneys in American adjudication. Indeed, parties and, by extension, attorneys (if the parties can afford them) are tasked with marshalling evidence-a function that is not the job of a finder of fact. 97. Social scientists call these norms a "script," a set of normal expectations about the sequencing of an activity to which humans adhere without thinking. JEAN MATTER MANDLER, STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA THEORY 94, 108 (1984) . A classic example is a "restaurant script"-the process of being seated, handed a menu, served, and paying a bill. Robert P. "what happened" from a non-legal perspective, or even sharing thoughts, emotions, or anything else that do not strictly contribute to a narrative about "what happened." This liberates participants from the limiting devices so characteristic of the fact-finding function of adjudication.
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A similar contrast can be drawn with the physical tableau presented by adjudication and mediation. The preeminent vision of adjudication is the judge who is physically isolated by the bench; indeed, attorneys can only "approach the bench" with permission. This physical elevation-a reflection of respect for the "law" of which a judge is the physical embodiment-is embedded in popular consciousness and, in all judicial settings and contexts, remains the essence of what a courtroom should look like. Consider, in contrast, the range of options available to a mediator about "physical arrangements." Mediators should carefully consider "seating patterns, the shape of the table, the amount of physical space allotted to and between disputants, physical objects that indicate authority or differences in power, and space for public or private interaction." 101 These are not trivial. As physical distancing and elevation have symbolic significance in adjudication, so do physical arrangements have significance in mediation. A central issue in mediation is "differences in power"-a concern to be dealt with by, among other things, choices about a round table, a desk behind which a mediator sits, no table at all, and who sits next to the mediator in all three of these arrangements. 102 These choices reflect the essence of mediation. Rather than imposing order and hierarchy-what courtroom arrangements not only do but are designed to doskilled mediators do their utmost to eliminate hierarchy at many levels: mediator to participants, participants to participants, and, if appropriate, lawyers to all. 103 It is a short step from understanding why a round table may be important in mediation to understanding a mediator's role. A mediator "facilitates" by seeking to enable and empower participants to do the work of dispute resolution. 104 A leading mediation scholar puts the idea this way:
[A mediator] assumes the parties are intelligent, able to work with their counterparts, and capable of understanding their situations better than either their lawyers or the mediator. So the parties may develop better solutions than any that the mediator might create. For these reasons . . . the facilitative mediator assumes that his principal mission is to enhance and clarify communications between the parties in order to help them decide what to do. 105 This role requires consistent effort on the part of a mediator. This effort may be transparent, including a statement from the mediator that draws an explicit contrast with adjudication. For example, one leading mediation text notes that some mediators will "explain that they are not a judge, jury or fact-finder." 106 Most mediation skills are not, to say the least, characteristic of judging: understanding the nuances of reframing and crafting questions in light of what participants say, 107 observations of body language and other non-verbal cues, 108 sensitivity to crosscultural issues, 109 carefully crafting questions, guarding against playing too active a role in solving problems, and empathy. 110 A mediator has no "power" to force participants to engage in mediation at all: her "power," at most, is to persuade participants of the value of the process.
111

B. How Mediation Sorts "What Matters" from "What Does Not Matter"
Forty years ago, Lon Fuller described the role "rules" play in mediation. According to Fuller, mediation liberates parties "from the encumbrance of rules" and "accept[s], instead, a relationship of mutual respect, trust [,] and understanding that will enable them to meet shared contingencies without the aid of formal prescriptions laid down in advance." 112 I will elaborate on the implications of Fuller's rich formulation.
Do Mediators Impose Rules?
A central characteristic of a mediator's role is as facilitator.
113 They are not rule-givers or fact-finders. 114 This is a simplification, however. Most mediators do exert "control," although its purpose and execution are in direct contrast to the "control" so typical of adjudication.
In line with Fuller's account, skilled mediators do not impose "formal prescriptions laid down in advance." A mediator, however, will often discuss "ground rules," which are typically such things as "rules" against shouting, interrupting, according equal time to participants, and, if necessary, time constraints for the mediation itself. These, however, are not "imposed" (a mediator has no power to impose) but rather established with the participants' agreement, thus representing and demonstrating a kind of "process control" exercised by the participants themselves. 115 The key is that these "ground rules," even to the extent a mediator by persuasion or perceived stature imposes them, do not have a limiting function as to what matters in mediation. To the contrary, they seek to enable participants to define what matters by eliminating process barriers to achieve that goal. In this respect, "ground rules" are not the procedural rules of adjudication, that is, they are not a formally imposed set of prescriptions designed to cabin "facts" in light of applicable rules.
In some respects, the entire panoply of mediator "techniques" I have briefly described already does the same thing. participants' world. 119 To again draw upon ideas from anthropology, mediation embraces "local knowledge," 120 that is, the knowledge of participants who have experienced and, in a fundamental sense, "know" what a dispute involves. This entails "a comprehensive mix of their needs, interests, and whatever else they deem relevant regardless of rules of evidence or strict adherence to substantive law."
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There is thus in mediation no "space" between participants' experience and the necessarily distant perspectives of others, including judges, juries, and lawyers.
122
This perspective can at times generate results that, from an outside perspective, seem odd. Consider the example addressed earlier to illustrate what surely would be irrelevant in dispute resolution: "[T]he color of socks worn by an offeree" in a contract dispute. 123 In mediation, maybe the color violated every rule of fashion sense, pairing, say, bright orange socks with a somber pinstriped suit. Maybe this offended the offeror, or undermined the offeree's credibility. Do the participants, or one participant, care? If she does or they do, it matters. The color of socks is unlikely to have meaning in the context of the dispute, but in mediation what is meaningful is not defined by preexisting rules. Probabilities do not matter: circumstances are odd and unpredictable enough to generate seemingly bizarre assertions of value or conflict.
Moving from socks to hats, another example that illustrates this point comes from Oliver Wendell Holmes in his famous essay "The Path of the Law."
124 The legal process, as translated through a lawyer, is one that:
[R]etain[s] only the facts of legal import, up to the final analyses and abstract universals of theoretic jurisprudence. The reason why a lawyer does not mention that his client wore a white hat when he made a contract, while Mrs. Quickly would be sure to dwell upon it along with the parcel gilt goblet and the sea-coal fire, is that he foresees that the public force [i.e., the law] will act in the same way whatever his client had upon his head.
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Socks or hats or gilt goblets are legal irrelevancies and the enemy of virtually all "reasoned" adjudication. In a textured, "local world," however, parties might have strong feelings 126 about this or that and, as such, can be part of mediation. 133 To the extent appreciation of alternative perspectives happens, the mediation process has profoundly altered the essence of what a dispute is, thus dissolving the premises of the adversarial system and its assumption of two contending visions of "truth." 134 Secondly, the parties' "comprehensive mix of their needs, interests, and whatever else they deem relevant" has to remain fluid when mediation is a success. 135 The exchange of such "comprehensive mixes" cannot be static by dint of all it includes, which is, to put it colloquially, a whole bunch of stuff. The mediator can nudge parties along this transformative process by structuring creative brainstorming, option generation, and ways for parties to better understand their "interests" rather than their "positions." 
Participants as Meaning-Makers
Even with all of its openness to meaning-making and its changes of perspectives and its cultivation of dispute transformation, the mediation process does not and cannot generate a free-for-all with no basis for resolving disputes.
Mechanisms to sort what matters from what does not matter are inevitable:
137 every activity must have a map that excludes and includes and a criteria to accomplish the excluding and including. 138 Fuller was careful to qualify his definition of mediation as operating "without the aid of formal prescriptions laid down in advance." 139 There still must be the "aid of prescriptions," albeit not formal or preexisting, and, thus, mediation cannot be, as one commentator suggests, "normative tabula rasa." 140 A way to get traction on what "prescriptions" are at play in mediation is to examine norms people follow in everyday life. These may be deeply rooted norms of fairness, of reciprocity, of looking hopefully to the future. After all, "people everywhere spend a good deal of effort and time figuring out what they ought to do, with whom, when, and how, and then doing it-or, if they don't do it, then explaining or justifying why not." 141 The "oughts" and "figuring outs" are necessarily normative. In adjudication, law is "oughts" and formalist syllogisms comprised of "fact" and "law" are the "figuring outs." In mediation, people search for their "oughts" as a means to "figure out" as they do "everywhere," both within and outside of dispute resolution. Mediation thus draws upon the "everywhere" skills people use every day.
Nevertheless, and perhaps ironically, it is commonplace for commentators to note that mediation may sometimes be performed in the "shadow of the law."
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Inevitably legal rules as communicated by attorneys or as understood by participants or by mediators themselves 143 are available to parties as a means of resolving disputes. Moreover, legal rules are a key component of an important negotiation and mediation concept called BATNA-the "Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement," 144 which in many but not all instances would be adjudication with all of its attendant formality. Nevertheless, legal norms are not the or sole norms as they are, at least in theory, in adjudication. This is, perhaps ultimately, the crucial distinction with mediation.
The final part of this Article will examine how attorneys do and should act as bridges across the dispute resolution divide.
V. THE ATTORNEY IN FACT
Thus far this Article has focused on the profound methodological differences between adjudication and mediation. The Article did examine how "facts" play out in advocacy, with attorneys engaging in anti-formalist "fact investigation" and story construction with the ultimate goal of integrating the result into formalist syllogism. 145 But the role of attorneys holds deeper lessons in light of the full analysis set forth in this Article: conflict definition, with definition bounded by facts, begins at the earliest stages of representation. This stage, which has attracted relatively little scholarly attention, holds great significance and promise in "on the ground" application of the themes developed in this Article.
facts-especially the notion of "one truth" that can be "found"-remains deeply embedded culturally 156 and cognitively. 157 Nevertheless, scholars and sophisticated practitioners have grappled with the bridging function of lawyers as perhaps the ultimate challenge of lawyering. Indeed, the insights of the clinical education movement over the last fifty years can, in part, be viewed as identifying and seeking to build a bridge from client to lawyer rather than from lawyer to client-a process usually termed "client-centered lawyering." 158 There is an element of the "empowering" norms of mediation when lawyers seek to come as close as possible to eliminating the space between advocate and client when communicating to third party decision-makers.
This point holds a new challenge for lawyers operating with clients in mediation in contrast to adjudication: mediation is disputing with agents, not through agents. And the prepositional shift, if mediation works as it hopes to, generates a verbal shift from disputing into collaborating. The end result is not disputing through agents, but collaborating with agents, plus, in the case of mediation, collaborating with agents with the aid of a facilitator.
With the rise of mediation, a central challenge of lawyering is thus to work with clients but not with the goal of communicating to a third party or, as the literature sometimes suggests, "translating" client stories to a third party. 159 Rather, it is to absorb the fluidity and openness of what "matters" and be a constructive agent (or, rather, collaborator) in mediation.
This topic remained for many years largely unexplored territory, but this is slowly changing of late as mediation spreads ever more widely and as attorneys' involvement with mediation grows, 160 as, indeed, it must. This has lead to increasing calls for attorneys to understand and adopt the mediation perspective, 161 with more scholars arguing for the modifications of the law school curriculum with ADR in mind. 162 [Vol. 63:1
B. War of the Worlds
This is a fascinating time to be a lawyer as the profession comes to terms with mediation. A substantial literature expresses fear about attorney involvement in mediation. 163 This concern can be framed in the terms of this Article's analysis: "Facts" in adjudication are not what mediation is about, 164 and thus attorneys immersed in adjudication inhibit the effectiveness of mediation or even the practice of mediation itself. At the other end of the spectrum are expressions of how lawyers should and have absorbed the "collaborating with agents" conception of lawyering 165 or that, at least, fears about the negative influence of lawyer on mediation are overblown. 166 Setting aside this debate, the ultimate goal in terms of lawyering is not that attorneys or, for that matter, scholars should jettison the map of adjudication. What is most important is for attorneys to recognize is that adjudication is a map, not the map. Adjudication, like any process or methodology or model, only includes what is necessary to its operation and excludes what is not. Attorneys should master different ways of processing disputes and facilitate the creation of the "world" in line with whatever mode of dispute resolution clients ultimately choose.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Facts" in adjudication is a term of art that reflects a specific methodology: the application of preexisting substantive and procedural rules which include and exclude in a very particular way. In contrast, mediation includes and excludes, but with no preexisting and binding rules. Rather, participants themselves identify and apply norms in light of the complexity of circumstances, which only they can fully know and understand. Both processes create a map to organize experience and circumstance. The difference is in how, when, and by whom the maps are made.
This difference, easily summarized, masks the mental gymnastics necessary to embrace, communicate, and implement different methodologies of conflict resolution. This is the ultimate challenge for mediators, mediation participants, and, perhaps most importantly, lawyers, who must reconfigure their professional outlook in order to see and thereby explain what is and is not in both mediation and adjudication.
